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I. The Problem 
 
 In the era of globalization, states are under greater pressure when dividing and directing 
resources. Despite globalization and modern neoliberal international political-economic 
dynamics which have engendered a reevaluation of developmental practice, the nation-state itself 
is still the primary driver of the development process.1 In this context, the expenditure on foreign 
aid has come under speculation. Much of the criticism is derived from allegations of aid 
ineffectiveness and concern that aid serves as a disincentive for self-directed advancement. 
African countries are often cited as examples of the failures of foreign aid because of their 
seemingly permanent status as receiver without significant developmental improvement. 
Theories of Development and Views on Aid   
 There are several main theories of development with which aid policy interacts. They 
include dependency, modernization, world systems, and globalization. Dependency theory 
claims that developed and prosperous nations require poorer, less developed countries in order to 
maintain their status.2 The underdevelopment of the peripheral countries is not due to their lack 
of integration and liberalization, rather they are intentionally integrated into the system in this 
way.  Essentially, the role of poor nations in the dependent system is to supply the natural 
resources, labor, and markets for the wealthy nations, which could not sustain their standard of 
living without the peripheral states. Dependency theorists view aid as a form of exploitation and 
self-enrichment in which first-world countries keep peripheral states subordinate and dependent 
on core donor states.3  
                                                          
1 F. Niyonkuru, "Failure of Foreign Aid in Developing Countries: A Quest for Alternatives." Business and Economics 
v. 7, no. 3 (2016), 1. 
2 Ruba Jaradat, "The Impact of Donor and Recipient Government Policies and Practices on the Effectiveness of 
Foreign Aid to a Middle Income Developing Country : Case Studies from Jordan", University of Huddersfield, 
(2008), 35. 
3 Niyonkuru, "Failure of Foreign Aid", 2. 
P a g e  | 2 
 
 Contrastingly, modernization theory argues that political development is supported by 
economic development and that the two are compatible and mutually reinforcing. It can be 
understood that political modernization includes the liberalization and democratization of 
government organization.4 Modernization theorists’ hypothesize that openness promotes 
modernization and aligns with the premise that the responsibility of development falls mainly on 
individual states. Importantly, the theory seems to imply that modernization and development are 
eventually guaranteed for all states, but that each state will become developed liberal 
democracies at a different pace. In modernization theory, aid can help to speed up the 
modernization process for states that lag behind, or it can artificially enhance political or 
economic modernization while neglecting the other necessary counterpart.5 
 Dependency theory and modernization theory function on the platform of the nation-
state. Meanwhile, world-systems theory and globalization theory are based on global networks.6 
World-system theory is based on ‘a unit with a single division of labor and multiple cultural 
systems’.7 In this model, private accumulation of capital propels the global market and world 
economy. The modern world-system is a capitalistic world-economy where the system itself is 
not a political organization but rather is made up of the economic linkages between state political 
units and their interconnecting economies.8 In general, neoliberal theorists may regard aid as ‘an 
extortion of resources, a long earned asset being dashed to impoverished nations incapable of 
making best use of it to effectively come out of poverty’, or see it as a way to open markets and 
increase profits.9 
                                                          
4 Jaradat, "Impact of Donor”, 35. 
5 Niyonkuru, "Failure of Foreign Aid", 2. 
6 Jaradat, "Impact of Donor”, 36. 
7 Ibid., 36. 
8 Ibid., 36. 
9 Niyonkuru, "Failure of Foreign Aid", 2. 
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 In globalization theory, ‘the interpretation of the current events on the international 
sphere in terms of development, economic conditions, social scenarios, and political and cultural 
influences’ is a world in which states are increasingly more integrated into the global economic 
enterprise.10 In this context, several progressions manifest; ‘worldwide active communication 
systems, and smooth economic conditions, especially high mobility of financial resources and 
trade liberalization’ as well as ‘the compression of the time and space of social relations and to 
the intensification of consciousness of the world existing as a whole’.11 Increasing economic, 
political and social influences originate, exist, and transverse national borders. Similar to the 
world-systems theory, globalization theory emphasizes an international system which promotes 
escalating integration and homogenization, with special attention given to the importance of 
increased economic connection. Nonetheless, the most significant aspect of the globalization 
theory is its focus on cultural factors.12 Globalization theorists’ see cultural relations as a key 
ingredient for contemporary development and therefore emphasize cross-cultural understanding 
between donor and recipient in aid provision.  
Concerns over Reliance 
 Regardless of one’s ascribed theory of development, there are broad concerns over the 
effectiveness of foreign aid. These grievances generally relate to the dilemma of the installation 
of foreign dependency. Much like in dependence theory, aid reliance creates a global order in 
which less developed countries are economically dependent on larger economies. This is, 
however, often viewed as reciprocally problematic because it creates a power structure in which 
                                                          
10 Jaradat, "Impact of Donor”, 37. 
11 Ibid., 37. 
12 Ibid., 37. 
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weaker states’ economies are contingent on externally sourced revenue and are highly 
susceptible to political influence.13 
  Foreign aid constructs a paternal responsibility for donor states that is not always 
beneficial or desired, while the reliant recipient state is dependent on benevolent aid provision 
and therefore surrenders a certain amount of political sovereignty in order to maintain the 
supportive relationship. For example, long-standing recipients of U.S. developmental and 
economic foreign aid in the top ten receiving countries, including six African countries, Jordan, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan, have not seen significant improvement towards self-reliance and 
development.14 In addition to domestic concerns of superfluous spending, aid has been criticized 
as an extension of imperialist power which serves as a tool of compellence, promoting 
underdevelopment, and even hastening environmental destruction; claims which are especially 
delicate in relation to aid in the African continent.15 But foreign aid is intended to have positive 
economic and political impacts, including democratization, transactional security, development, 
humanitarian relief, and social welfare.16 
 Reflected in the ideology expressed by the USAID, the intended end of foreign aid is the 
ultimate elimination of it.17 A key obstacle in achieving this goal is aid reliance. What causes aid 
reliance? What factors, and at what level(s), are responsible for the enduring dependence on 
international assistance? Aid reliance may originate from decision-maker failure to properly 
allocate resources or from bureaucracy’s misuse of funds due to pervasive state-wide corruption. 
However, this paper will explore the broader comprehensive relationship between conditionality 
                                                          
13 Frances Moore Lappé, Joseph Collins, and David Kinley. "Aid as obstacle" IDRC reports, v. 9, no. 2 (1980). 
14 Max Bearak and Lazaro Gamio, “The U.S. foreign aid budget, visualized” The Washington Post. (2016). 
15 Krishna Nath Sharm, "Self-Reliance and Aid: No Positive Relation." Economic and Political Weekly v. 2, no. 50 
(1967). 
16Raymond C. Offenheiser and Rodney Bent. “Foreign Aid Benefits Developing Nations”, Greenhaven Press, (2010). 
17 USAID, "What We Do", United States Agency for International Development. (2019). 
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of aid provision and aid reliance, in which factors of corruption and individual decision-makers 
can be explicitly and implicitly included. Through evaluations of the length of aid collection, use 
of aid funds, indicators of self-sustaining growth, and state rhetoric on foreign aid provisions, aid 
reliance can be identified and assessed in relation to conditionality.18 
II. Two Alternate Hypotheses 
A. Individual Decision-Maker  
 
At the individual level of analysis, a possible explanation for dependence on foreign aid is 
the decisions on the allocation of aid resources that are made in within government structures, 
often by individuals or small groups. Lack of effective aid dispersal at the point of entry prevents 
aid from engendering the desired development and contingent self-sufficiency and independence. 
An individual ideology which prioritizes a direction of aid towards maintenance and treatment of 
developing challenges without also addressing roots of developmental and provisional problems 
will lead to the continued need of international developmental funds. Individual decision-makers 
and/or small groups who have control over the use of aid may prioritize immediate needs and 
short-term policy due to personal experience and connections instead of investing in long-term 
developmental projects with aid funds, or individuals may be apathetic to aid to begin with making 
its application inefficient. The motivation of the individual or the small groups, due to intimate 
proximity which prioritizes immediate needs over long-term projects, or is apathetic to aid 
usefulness in the first place, promotes the ineffective use of developmental aid.  
 Jordan’s government structure does not employ broadly applicable systematic governance 
or policy that aligns and directs government institutions. “Lack of coordination and cooperation 
                                                          
18Robert Lensink and Howard White, “Aid dependence: Issues and indicator’s”, Almqvist & Wiksell, vo. 2 (1999). 
18Hilde Selbervik, "Aid and conditionality: The role of the bilateral donor: A case study of Norwegian-Tanzanian aid 
 relationship”, (1999). 
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between the different government institutions or of effective monitoring and evaluation practices, 
centralized management” can hinder the implementation of aid programs.19 Therefore, it is up to 
the independent institution which receives the aid to determine how much of their human capital 
and time they will devote to putting aid funds into action.  In this way, aid effectiveness is highly 
reliant on individual “government employees to efficiently implement development projects”.20 
Employees of the state typically receive low salaries and do not have a strong incentive system or 
career ladder.21 Additionally, government jobs are considered stable and secured employment 
regardless of individual performance, which may disincentivize professional development.  
 The primary decision-maker or person in power in a department or ministry can either “be 
in favor of the development project or hinder its implementation”.22 Furthermore, aid projects that 
are explicitly promoted by or aligned with King Abdullah often receive more institution support 
and individual incentive to work towards aid goals. Because of this, King Abdullah has 
considerable power over the execution of aid projects. This shows how it is possible for the 
“practices and attitudes of government employees [to impact] the effective implementation of aid” 
as well as the power of the King to affect aid mobilization.23 
Allocation of aid determined by the authority of an individual person(s) may result in the 
ineffective distribution and/or use of aid and maintained aid reliance. This suggests the hypothesis: 
If individuals are the primary determining authority on the distribution, utilization, and 
implementation of international developmental aid, then the state will become perpetually 
dependent on foreign aid. As a parliamentary monarchy, Jordan has both diffused and central 
                                                          
19 Jaradat, "Impact of Donor”, 270. 
20 Ibid., 269. 
21 Ibid., 270. 
22 Ibid., 270. 
23 Ibid., 269. 
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decision-making authorities, through the King and individual departments as discussed above. 
Despite the opportunity for flawed decision-making involving aid deployment in Jordan, I do not 
find this level of analysis to be wholly convincing since it is not guaranteed that individual or small 
group decision makers will necessarily make ineffective judgments in the use and implementation 
of foreign aid simply because of diffused government structure. This level of analysis requires that 
an assumption is made about the decisions of individuals and small elite groups. “Certainly the 
role that different individuals and groups have is important. But in addition to agency there is the 
important part of structure” both politically and economically that provide more a compelling 
explanation for the development of aid reliance.24     
B. Domestic Determinants  
 
  At the domestic level of the state, government, and institutions, corruption will prevent the 
adequate application of foreign aid. Similar to the individual level analysis where aid funds are 
unproductively dispersed, domestic level determinants where state function is distorted and 
undermined by commonplace corruption, foreign aid will likely never reach its imagined 
destination. This nefarious manipulation of aid, when occurring systematically on a state-wide 
basis, redirects aid from intended purposes, therefore preventing it from creating the desired 
benefit to the receiving state. This creates the hypothesis: If the recipient state has pervasive levels 
of state-wide corruption, then it will become reliant on foreign aid.  
 While this hypothesis is more convincing because it answers the question in the individual 
level hypothesis of why funds are necessarily misallocated, it still does not adequately explain 
persistent aid reliance. Countries, where extensive corruption is recognized, are not likely to 
                                                          
24 Guy Burton, "Constraints on Aid Conditionality: The Case of the European Commission and the Palestinian 
Authority", Journal of Global Analysis, vo. 3, no. 2 (2012), 23. 
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receive aid, nor to continue to receive it enough to become dependent. States receiving aid must 
be found to not intentionally misuse foreign aid and have protocol and precedent for the prevention 
and intolerance of systematic corruption. Jordan struggles with persistent aid dependence, but the 
states CPI (Corruption Perceptions Index) is moderate and continues to improve yearly.25 
Therefore, foreign aid reliance does not necessarily result from pervasive corruption.    
III. Testable Hypothesis  
C. International Environment 
 
  If individual action and state-level corruption are not satisfactory explanations for the 
genesis of foreign aid reliance then a broader level of analysis is required. Individual-level 
decisions on allocation and the possibility of corruption can both be addressed in the original 
dispensing of aid. That is the conditions with which the aid is provided. Donor countries are in the 
position to put restrictions and parameters on the handling and use of aid. This constrains aid use 
to donor preference, ensure proper use, and mitigate for effectiveness. On one hand, conditionality 
is thought to prevent corruption and misuse of aid which would result in dependence. However, 
this also prevents aid from being utilized based on state and locally determined needs, which makes 
aid less effective. Therefore, highly politicized restrictions and conditionality leave little room for 
state self-diagnosis of aid directives, creating a high probability for development of aid reliance. 
Hence; if highly restrictive conditionality is imposed on international aid - which will result in 
ineffective use of aid - then recipient states will become reliant on foreign aid.  
IV. Measuring and Testing 
A. Dependent Variable: Aid Reliance 
 Defining Reliance   
                                                          
25 Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2018", Transparency International, (2019).  
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 The terminology of aid reliance and aid dependence are often referred to in debates of the 
efficacy of foreign aid. However, it is important to explicitly define what constitutes dependency 
on aid, how dependency is determined and measured, and what normative assessment is made 
about aid reliance. Aid dependence and reliance are commonly referred to with the intention to 
mean; “(1 receiving aid at all or aid above a certain level, (2 receiving more aid than can usefully 
be utilized, (3 ineffective aid, (4 when aid itself generates either the “need” for aid or mitigates 
against achieving its intended objectives, or (5 when the design of aid programs (or policies more 
generally) is dominated by the donor community”.26 However, these sprawling uses of the term 
obscure the more explicit definition of aid dependence and reliance, which is, briefly, the continual, 
functional dependence of an economy on international funding. It is widely assumed that “a 
country which appears to require large aid inflows to either sustain or achieve modest 
improvements in living standards” is aid dependent.27 When state provisions and operations 
become reliant on external funding in order to maintain performance, a state is necessarily 
dependent on those external sources of revenue. A more finite definition may express aid 
dependence as “the case of a country needing aid to obtain an objective in the foreseeable future, 
where aid is explicitly necessary to achieve the objective”.28 
Determining the Extent of Dependency  
 Level of dependence is generally determined and measured as a ratio of aid amount to GDP 
(the percentage of aid to GDP which denotes dependence can range from 15-45% depending on 
the source) or conversely the simple litmus test of whether a specific objective could be completed 
                                                          
26 Lensink, White, “Aid dependence”, 7. 
27 Ibid., 15. 
28 Ibid., 7. 
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without externally sourced funding.29 For example, aid may not be needed in order to achieve net 
economic growth, but it could be that economic growth would not also encapsulate poverty 
reduction initiatives without external sources of influence and funding. Alternatively, it is possible 
for a state to not be aid dependent if the specific objective is to reduce poverty, but the same state 
could be classified as dependent if the objective was reducing poverty by 5% by the year 2025.30 
Additionally, it is important to acknowledge that “aid alone will never ensure attainment of the 
objectives of development” because “outcomes are expressed as a function of aid and some other 
factors – and inputs of all factors are required”.31  
 When aid dependence is determined by the percentage of GDP, it is assumed that high 
ratios of aid as revenue is indicative of ineffective or incapable independent governance. To be 
sure, “high aid inflows can be a problem since (1 they simply cannot be productively utilized; and 
(2 they not only allow an economy not to adjust but rather encourage it to move to an even less 
sustainable policy path”.32 There is also concern that when aid constitutes a large percentage of 
government revenue, a mindset of “let the donors do it” emerges which actively “undermine[s] 
indigenous institutions”.33 By this determinant of aid dependence, a “large number of developing 
countries remain highly aid-dependent, in terms of aid-to-GDP ratio”.34 
Normative Evaluation of Aid Reliance   
 Unchecked aid dependency is seen as a resource drain and fruitless cost for donor states, 
while also representing challenges to recipient government sovereignty while further undermining 
                                                          
29Hailu Degol and Admasu Shiferaw, "Determinants of 'Exit' from High Aid-Dependence", Journal of African 
Economies, vo. 25, no. 5 (2016), 673. 
29 Lensink and White, “Aid dependence”, 16-17. 
30 Ibid., 16-17. 
31 Ibid., 18. 
32 Ibid., 21. 
33Lensink and White, “Aid dependence”, 66. 
34Degol and Shiferaw, "Determinants of 'Exit'", 671. 
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domestic capacity.35 Furthermore, there is strong evidence that suggests that high degrees of aid 
dependency are “self-reinforcing, stifle creativity and self-reliance”.36 There is a general push to 
reduce aid amounts as a way to cut back on aid reliance, but consider that “a country may 
experience a reduction in aid-to-GDP ratio (and therefore aid reliance) even as the volume of aid 
rises so long as the rate of increase is slower than GDP growth rate”, so “a reduction in aid 
dependence may not necessarily mean a reduction in the volume of aid flows”.37 Additionally, 
objective evaluations of foreign aid must be critical of the automatic categorization of aid 
dependence as fundamentally bad. Confusing aid dependence with “bad aid” is not always 
necessary. “Bad aid may simply be ineffective aid, or more perniciously, aid with harmful effects 
so that the recipient would be better off with less aid”.38 But if aid dependence is simply the 
inability to achieve an objective without external intervention, isn’t aid just functioning as it is 
intended to? 
How Dependency Develops 
 There are several possible explanations for the occurrence and development of foreign aid 
reliance. High aid flow from uncoordinated donors, each with distinct project goals, may perhaps 
“overwhelm the management capacity of governments” by inflicting large transaction costs of 
managing aid projects, conducting evaluation, and reporting.39 Or perhaps a kind of dependency 
syndrome occurs in a similar manner to the “welfare trap” in which aid disincentivizes reform, 
trapping recipients into the continued need for aid.40 Others argue that aid is “unnecessary and 
                                                          
35  Degol and Shiferaw, "Determinants of 'Exit'", 670. 
35 Lensink and White, “Aid dependence”, 19. 
36 Degol and Shiferaw, "Determinants of 'Exit'", 671. 
37 Ibid., 684. 
38 Lensink and White, “Aid dependence”, 7. 
39 Paul Collier, "Aid 'Dependency': A Critique", Journal of African Economies, vo. 8, no. 4 (1999), 528. 
40 Collier, "Aid 'Dependency'”, 528) 
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indeed a distraction”, emphasizing that “governments should focus on attracting private capital 
rather than aid”.41 Further hypotheses speculate that “aid flows, determined by donor fads, are so 
fickle that they are a source of instability rather than a basis for sustained growth.42 Yet another 
model establishes that “while in good policy environments aid is beneficial, it may nevertheless 
be the case that, beyond a certain amount, at the margin aid becomes detrimental” because “the 
government becomes so overwhelmed by aid projects that the business of government becomes 
dominated by the need to satisfy donors, replacing the need to satisfy citizens”.43 
 The strongest theory on the development of aid reliance is the effect of aid on fiscal policy. 
“Large and sustained aid inflows undermine tax capacity and public investment” and there is 
legitimate concern that foreign aid “can reduce government’s reliance on the domestic tax base” 
by substituting aid for tax-based revenue, therefore weakening their domestic tax effort, 
discouraging necessary policy reform which would enhance domestic revenue, and undermining 
state accountability.44 In this way, aid would indeed hinder reform rather than support it and make 
it “possible that aid generates aid dependence by undermining domestic institutional capacity or 
by eliminating the need for policies to move the country to self-reliance”.45 
 Objectively, aid may, or may not, incentivize a decrease in tax revenue. Indeed, foreign aid 
has the potential to increase tax revenue through improved taxation systems and collection policy 
reforms stipulated in conditions of the donation.46 Additionally, while aid may negatively influence 
domestic tax efforts, “in effect, the population is choosing that some of the benefits of aid accrue 
                                                          
41 Ibid., 529. 
42 Ibid., 529  
43 Ibid., 530. 
44 Lensink and White, “Aid dependence”, 20. 
44 Jean-Louis Combes, Rasmane Ouedraogo, and Sampawende Tapsoba, "Structural Shifts in Aid Dependency and 
Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries", Applied Economics, v. 48, no. 46 (2016), 4427. 
45 Lensink and White, “Aid dependence”, 20. 
46 Combes, Ouedraogo, and Tapsoba, "Structural Shifts”, 4428. 
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to households most efficiently by passing the money on to them to spend, by means of reducing 
taxation, while some of the benefits of aid accrue to households most efficiently through increased 
public expenditure”.47 
 Interestingly, “the likelihood of an upward shift [in aid dependency] increases with the 
acceptance of market-oriented policies or the presence of an IMF program” and “downward shifts 
[in aid dependency] occur more often as recipient countries develop or do not exhibit diplomatic 
ties with the key players in international relations, that is, the United States or Russia”.48 
“Experiencing an aid upward shift leads to a loss of about 2.3% of tax-to-GDP, discourages public 
investment, [and is] associated with a decrease in capital expenditure” while also reducing 
investment spending and increasing current government expenditure”.49 Additionally, “countries 
with initially modest aid-to-GDP ratios are more likely to stave off high dependence on aid and to 
reduce it even further” while “countries with initially high aid dependence are more likely to 
remain heavily reliant on aid and become increasingly so”.50  
For the Purpose of this Study   
 By looking at the length of time that a country has received aid, indicators of self-sustaining 
growth, and state rhetoric on foreign aid provisions, as well as the indicators established above, 
the existence and degree of reliance on aid can be evaluated. The case study of Jordan is useful in 
this endeavor because the Middle Eastern kingdom is largely assumed to be reliant on foreign aid. 
The state is a long-standing recipient of international aid, including from U.S. sources. 
Additionally, King Abdullah II of Jordan often stresses the obligation of the international 
community to pay their share in the international crisis mitigation, particularly referencing the 
                                                          
47 Collier, "Aid 'Dependency'”, 533. 
48 Combes, Ouedraogo, and Tapsoba, "Structural Shifts”, 4427. 
49 Ibid., 4435. 
50 Degol and Shiferaw, "Determinants of 'Exit'", 689. 
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need for foreign aid contributions for hosting refugees. Therefore, there are satisfactory sources 
and previous studies available for the evaluation of aid reliance in Jordan that can assist in its use 
as a case study.     
 It is important to emphasize that an underlying assumption of aid is that “as long as 
financial aid is delivered to countries with good policies, aid-dependence will decline due to rising 
per capita income. However, strict aid conditionality has a bad performance record” and “unless 
aid allocation is transformed by restraining donor strategic interests, aid will remain ineffective 
which in turn may perpetuate aid-dependence”.51 
B. Independent Variable: Conditionality  
Defining Conditionality 
   Conditionality is the use of conditions and restrictions attached to a provided benefit 
which stipulates the provision of such benefits or ensures that the provisions are utilized in terms 
that are deemed acceptable by the source. In foreign aid, this concept functions by making aid 
provision originally or continually contingent on the agreement to specified terms of use by the 
receiving state.52 Commonly, conditionality is established as the “preconditions laid down by 
lenders”.53 Ideally, aid conditions involve a process of mutual negotiations and arrangements 
which ultimately conclude in an “imperfectly enforceable dynamic contract between the donor 
and the recipient government”.54 
Imposing Conditions 
                                                          
51 Degol and Shiferaw, "Determinants of 'Exit'", 671. 
52 Gabriella Montinola, "When Does Aid Conditionality Work?" Comparative International Development, v. 45, no. 
3 (2019), 358. 
53 Rich Roland, "Applying Conditionality to Development Assistance”, Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, 11, no. 
4 (2004), 323. 
54 Almuth Scholl, "Debt Relief for Poor Countries: Conditionality and Effectiveness", Economica, v. 85, no. 339 
(2019), 626. 
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 The practice of conditionality on aid can be applied through several different 
combinations of stipulations. Conditionality can be positive and ex post, which is the selectivity 
of aid provision “not only in the choice of aid projects, but selectivity in the appreciation of 
policies in developing countries that attract aid”.55 Traditionally and for the purpose of this 
investigation, conditionality is negative and ex ante, meaning that it applies specific requirements 
to be followed upon receiving aid, essentially allowing donors to ‘‘buy’’ policy reform in 
recipient countries.56 Negative, ex ante aid  “responds to specific events in a given recipient 
country” by holding the threat of suspending aid over borrowing states as a “direct and 
articulated response to a perceived abuse” of human rights or aid precondition agreements.57 
 Conditions may include the practice of ‘tying’ aid or stipulating that some of the aid 
given be spent on goods and/or services from the donor country. Tying foreign assistance to the 
purchase of specific donor produced goods is a tactic of donors to ensure a return on 
investment.58 Enforcing ex ante conditions on countries receiving aid is a primary way for 
donors to “put in place measures that would make it possible for them to get paid back”, it was a 
sort of “substitute for collateral assets” that were assumed to ensure success of aid provisions and 
projects, at least for the donor economy.59 Others see ex ante conditions as a safeguard against 
moral hazards and a way to “ensure effectiveness in resolving problems for which they were to 
resolve”.60 It is assumed that negative, ex ante conditions stipulated for aid are enforceable by 
                                                          
55Roland, "Applying Conditionality”, 328. 
56 Hannes Oehler, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Axel Dreher, "Does Conditionality Work? A Test for an Innovative US 
Aid Scheme." European Economic Review, v. 56, no. 1 (2011), 138. 
57Roland, "Applying Conditionality”, 325. 
57Bernhard Reinsberg, "Foreign Aid Responses to Political Liberalization", World Development, v. 75 (2015), 47. 
58Burton, "Constraints”, 13. 
59 Ibid., 13. 
60 Niyonkuru, "Failure of Foreign Aid", 3. 
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the threat of withholding aid installments, canceling project support, or cutting off future aid if 
there is a failure to implement conditions.61  
 Ex ante and negative conditionality can include provisional conditions which are political 
and/or economic. Political conditionality explicitly focuses on the regime, human rights record, 
and political situation of the aid-receiving state while economic conditions seek to reform the 
economic policy and institutions.62 Conditions that dictate funding for social welfare provision, 
environmental protection and climate change, support to non-state organizations involved in 
human development, and food security and migration issues are more closely related to political 
conditionality as they are intended to promote good governance, protection of human rights, 
protection of natural resources, and state building in post-conflict cases.63 Conditions attached to 
aid which are contingent on specific fiscal or economic reforms, or otherwise generally buttress 
national budget are generally regarded as economic conditionality.  Aid can also include 
“humanitarian aid meant to offer quick relief intervention to alleviate suffering due to man-made 
disasters and conflicts” but this is not so much developmental aid than it is emergency, short-
term humanitarian assistance.64  
 In the international bilateral and multilateral donor community, there is high variability in 
the kinds of provisions that can be imposed. Specifically, bilateral government donors “are not 
legally constrained in their use of political conditionality”.65 But, contrastingly, the World Bank 
                                                          
61 Roland, "Applying Conditionality”, 324. 
61Niyonkuru, "Failure of Foreign Aid", 3. 
62 Nadia Molenaers, Sebastian Dellepiane and Jorg Faust, "Political Conditionality and Foreign Aid", World 
Development, v. 75 (2019), 2. 
63 Niyonkuru, "Failure of Foreign Aid", 2. 
64 Niyonkuru, "Failure of Foreign Aid", 2. 
65 Bernhard, "Foreign Aid Responses”, 48. 
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and other multilateral development organizations, are unable to impose political conditionality” 
and instead impose stringent economic conditionality.66 
Brief History of Conditionality in Foreign Aid 
 The widespread practice of disbursing developmental aid is commonly associated with 
the Marshall Plan established during the Cold War. It is generally regarded as both successful 
and generous. However, in terms of contingencies on aid disbursement, it is also associated with 
'severe conditionality'. “Every country benefiting from American assistance had to sign a 
bilateral agreement binding it to balance budgets, restore financial stability and stabilize 
exchange rates at realistic levels”.67 Prior to the Marshall plan, conditionality was utilized only 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), “which conditioned its loans on countries’ reducing 
their fiscal and current account deficits”.68 Then in the 1980s, the World Bank also began to “tie 
disbursal of its funds to structural adjustment, which included measures similar to those required 
by the IMF as well as privatization and public sector reform”.69  
 Shortly thereafter, almost all bilateral government donors began to stipulate disbursement 
developmental aid on recipients being “on track with IMF and/or World Bank programs”.70 This 
translated into the ‘‘short-leash’’ conditionality of the 1990s in which donors released aid in 
several installments, with each sum dispersal dependent on the progress of the recipient state in 
accomplishing reform.71 From here, bilateral aid conditions expanded past the economic 
restrictions of the IMF and World Bank to include “conditions to cover government expenditure 
and public sector employment, then began to deal with opening up the economy to greater 
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competition, and finally, currently, to deal with the design and practices of the institutions of 
governments”.72 Over time, trends in aid conditions evolved, beginning with the focus on 
“'nation building', strong executives, and rigorous revenue collection regimes” and then shifting 
to the “desirability for small government, mantras of deregulation, privatization, and 
outsourcing”.73 The current trend in conditionality is to focus on selective or ex post aid while 
also “reducing support for stand-alone projects, and increasing support for sector-wide 
reforms”.74 
The Purpose of Conditionality 
 In theory, aid will be ‘‘remarkably effective if it induces governments to adopt growth-
inducing and poverty-reducing policies”. It is assumed that through conditionality developed 
states can force growth-inducing and poverty-reducing reform.75 Since poor countries do not 
have enough liquid capital that is necessary to invest in these kinds of reform, they require an 
external funder to close the “financing gap”.76 There is evidence that “self-enforcing conditional 
aid” does indeed strengthen the economy and help states develop at a faster rate. Yet, it is likely 
that much foreign aid is not effectively directed or used, thus development remains largely 
stagnant.77  
 Supporters of conditionality maintain that stipulating the adoption of market-oriented 
policies and other donor directed reform prevents foreign aid from simply “propping up” 
inefficient governments. Conditions are “intended to make development assistance more 
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effective and increase living standards in recipient countries”.78  As reforms are implemented, 
and aid funding is increasingly functioning in more satisfactory policy environments, the 
effectiveness of aid will increase, the economy will grow faster, and the need for aid will 
decrease. Expanded, this process has four stages; “(1 ‘low aid, low growth’ stage of initial aid 
receipt, (2 ‘high aid, low growth’ stage in which increased aid flows have no immediate impact 
because of lag, (3 ‘high aid, high growth’ stage in which aid flows remain high, and become 
more effective, and 4) ‘low aid, high growth’ stage in which aid diminishes but growth continues 
at a high pace”.79 
 However, donors are not always able to strictly impose conditionality.80 “Donors may see 
their ability to impose conditions undermined by recipients, third parties and donors 
themselves”.81 Firstly, countries receiving aid can attempt to limit conditionality by using 
domestic vetoes and/or by simply refusing to carry out some of the conditions imposed. 
Secondly, third parties can undercut donors’ ability to enforce conditions. For example, 
historically lax enforcement of conditionality has been linked to political pressure from major 
states. Specifically, “punishment for noncompliance with IMF conditions is significantly weaker 
for countries that are considered to be important to the United States”.82 Lastly, donors 
themselves, when acting collectively, may contradict each other’s strategic interests if they lack 
coordination.  
The Case against Conditionality 
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 Although the existing assessments of conditionality are inconclusive, a large number of 
studies have concluded that ‘‘there is no empirical evidence showing that conditions enhance 
ownership or make program success more likely”.83 Still, others insist that “conditionality as an 
instrument to promote reform has been a failure”.84 Empirical evidence of the ineffectiveness of 
traditional conditionality would reasonably cause a shift away imposing conditions on aid. 
However, for both bilateral and multilateral donors, this has not been the case. Instead, there is a 
noticeable “decline in the average number of conditions”.85 
 At the core of anti-conditionality arguments is the concept that conditionality necessarily 
“implies the presence of conflicts of interest” between donors and receiving states.86 The power 
dynamic between donor and recipient is significant in aid-donor relationships. Donors tend to be 
stronger than recipients in aid relationships and conditionality is a potent tool for the donor, 
especially when aid is significant in amount and/or need. Due to the asymmetric donor-recipient 
relationship, recipients are often “willing to compromise and accept conditions that could be 
harmful in some respect in order to secure aid”.87  
 For this reason, conditions on foreign aid are often determined by donors and with their 
objectives in mind, rather than the recipients’ needs.88 It therefore also becomes likely that aid 
and conditions are constructed to “advance the strategic and political interests of donor 
countries” who “have an incentive to cater to their domestic public opinion”.89 Their objective in 
offering and conditioning aid is to acquire and maintain allies, natural resources, and military 
                                                          
83Oehler, Nunnenkamp, and Dreher, "Does Conditionality Work”, 139. 
84 Killick, "Politics, Evidence and the New Aid Agenda", 13. 
85 Ibid., 14 
86 Oehler, Nunnenkamp, and Dreher, "Does Conditionality Work”, 139. 
87Jaradat, "Impact of Donor”, 65. 
87Burton, "Constraints on Aid Conditionality”, 14. 
88 Sana' Nayef Elhennawi, "Impact Evaluation of Foreign Assistance and Donors Efforts on the Development 
Performance: Case of Jordan", Global Journal of Economics and Business, v. 1, no. 1 (2016), 30. 
89 Bernhard, "Foreign Aid Responses”, 49. 
P a g e  | 21 
 
presence.90 In prioritizing and conditioning their domestic concerns, donor countries are able to 
“stabilize their economies and strengthen their influence over developing countries” through 
developmental aid. Through conditionality, donors can promote not only commercial objectives 
but values, cultural aspirations and political interests in recipient states. It is then possible for 
“donor countries to interfere with the internal affairs of a recipient country through conditioned 
aid and through domestic governance related projects” which effectively handicaps recipient 
state sovereignty.91 
  This dynamic, in which “strengthening economic ties with recipient countries allows 
donor countries to utilize foreign aid to open new markets and support their commercial 
interests”, can create a quasi-imperialist relationship.92 Embedded values in aid conditions 
impose donor objectives on recipients generally.93 Those who support this critique on aid and 
conditionality often reference that “France and the UK give most of their aid to former colonies 
and the aid programs of the U.S. are dominated by strategic interests” rather than the necessity of 
economic development.94 Tied aid is particularly critiqued as an “imperialist means for donors to 
maintain influence and control of undeveloped states in the long term and keeping a hand on the 
management of the affairs of other nations for their own gain.95  
 Even disregarding the possibility of intended imperialist policy, conditionality often 
results in “donor agencies attempt[ing] to prescriptively transfer knowledge based on their own 
universalizing theories instead of trying to adopt a contextually grounded process of learning 
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with recipient counterparts”.96 Even assuming that political and economic conditions achieve the 
intended reform, there is a risk that the “fiscal austerity measures would reduce the already low 
living standards of the poor, trade liberalization would ruin domestic industries and increase 
unemployment, and capital account liberalization would open up less developed countries to 
investments from multinational corporations (MNCs) but only benefit the MNCs and a small 
group of elites”.97 Therefore, the conditions themselves create significant costs because they 
require policy measures that probably would not have been implemented otherwise, or at least 
not at the same pace. This not only generates political and economic risks but also “reduces 
government ability to manage these risks”.98 Additionally, transactional costs are further incurred 
with the monitoring and reporting that conditions necessitate.99 
 Imposing conditions on aid deliverance can vary the effectiveness of aid use depending 
on the degree of conditionality. It can be assumed that both highly restrictive conditional aid and 
unrestricted aid can produce foreign dependence, and have negative effects on the 
productiveness of foreign aid. Conditionality can be evaluated by referencing direct terms of aid, 
as well as looking at the way aid is, and is not, used. The long history of foreign aid to Jordan 
will provide a wealth of information on the differing levels and qualitative significance of 
conditionality. In particular, as one of the few states that is a primary recipient of U.S. aid in both 
the developmental/economic assistance category as well as the security assistance category the 
conditionality and effectiveness of both kinds of aid can be analyzed comparatively.100  
V. Case Study: Jordan 
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Country Context 
 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is classified as a middle-income country and has 
made significant strides towards economic and political reform but remains underdeveloped for a 
variety of reasons.101 Despite having limited natural resources, the Kingdom possesses a largely 
favorable and decently effective policy environment which makes it an attractive recipient of 
foreign aid. Although small in terms of land area, its strategically significant geopolitical 
positioning also attracts aid donors who are particularly interested in security, of which the 
United States is a sound example.102 Many donor states, the U.S. included, have retained close 
aid relations with Jordan in part due to its international and regional geopolitics. However, lack 
of resources and an only partially developed service economy makes Jordan susceptible to 
external shocks.103   
 This vulnerability, coupled with a policy environment and relative stability which 
promotes aid favorability, makes Jordan a receiver of relatively large amounts of foreign aid 
which is estimated to make up between 4% and 10% of its yearly GDP.104 Beyond an internal 
economy that is highly reliant on external factors, Jordan also faces serious challenges with 
limited arable land, lack of adequate water resources, and continuous conflict in the region, often 
in states who share direct borders.105 Water scarcity, in particular, is a significant constraint on 
development. Therefore, considerable amounts of the Government of Jordan’s (GOJ) 
expenditure goes towards maintaining security, stability, and mitigation. With the expanding 
                                                          
101 Jeremy Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan." Congressional Research Service, (2014), 5-6. 
101Jaradat, "The Impact of Donor”, 16. 
102 Ibid., 16. 
103 Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan", 5-6. 
103 Jaradat, "The Impact of Donor”, 16. 
104Jaradat, "The Impact of Donor”, 16. 
105 Ibid., 16. 
P a g e  | 24 
 
population, partially inflated by large refugee flows, the national economy struggles to keep up 
with the rate of population growth which stagnates income, threatens widespread unemployment, 
and stresses limited resources.106 Such challenges will require major investments in social 
services.107 “The economic outlook of Jordan is expected to witness a high level of uncertainty 
due to the rapid increase of international oil prices, the level of foreign aid, the regional political 
situation, and the flows of short-term external capital”.108  
  There is some disagreement on the level of poverty in the Hashemite Kingdom, who 
estimates their own poverty around 30%, which doubles the World Bank estimate of 15%.109 
Regardless, poverty is a serious challenge to social and economic development, but also attracts 
donors. For both the Government of Jordan and potential aid donors, poverty alleviation is a 
major priority.110 To Jordan’s advantage in the international aid environment, the state’s “social 
indicators are above the average for Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries and are 
better than a number of middle-income developing countries” which has allowed it to make 
substantial progress in the expansion of human capital specifically.111 However successful, these 
reforms came at significant financial costs and with questionable economic efficiency.112 
 Such a fickle national and regional environment creates unstable conditions for 
development despite ambitious economic reform and substantial foreign assistance. In general, 
Jordan faces three main challenges to sustainable development, which were explored above; 1) 
regional conflicts which jeopardize security and strain resources, 2) high government 
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expenditure coupled with shock-vulnerable income models, and 3) poverty and unemployment 
along with expanding population.113 
Barriers to Development 
 Jordan still faces serious challenges of economic underdevelopment and backwardness, 
such as external economic dependence, which prevent self-sustaining economic growth and 
requires drastic reforms in fiscal institutions.114 In addition to this, Jordan faces legitimate 
resource challenges which only intensify with mass influxes of refugees. This necessitates not 
only continued economic development aid but short-term humanitarian relief aid. It is this type 
of emergency humanitarian aid which King Abdullah routinely implores from the 
internationality community, in fact, 45% of total foreign aid can be categorized as short-
impact.115 The desire for economic reform and development as well as mounting security and 
refugee crisis related expenses cause Jordan to largely continue to seek out foreign investment.116 
Recipient of Developmental Aid 
 Jordan receives one of the largest U.S. developmental aid packages globally and has 
received U.S. economic aid since 1951.117 It received $1.5 billion in bilateral aid from the U.S. in 
2017 as well as approximately 500 million in bilateral and multilateral loan aid from the World 
Bank (USAID and World Bank sites). The U.S. figure accounts for a majority of aid, with other 
notable donors including the EU, Japan, Germany, Spain, and Saudi Arabia.118 “Large amounts 
of aid Jordan receives mainly supports its economic growth and balance of payment situation” 
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which signifies a lack of coordination among different donors.119 Aid is primarily funneled and 
coordinated through the Jordanian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.120 The 
most recent aid agreement between the U.S. and Jordan was established in 2018. 
 On February 14, 2018, the United States and Jordan signed a new Memorandum of 
 Understanding (or MOU) on U.S. foreign assistance to Jordan. The MOU, the third such 
 agreement between the U.S. and Jordan, commits the United States to provide $1.275 
 billion per year in bilateral foreign assistance over a five-year period for a total of 
 $6.375 billion (FY2018-FY2022). This latest MOU represents a 27% increase in the U.S. 
 commitment to Jordan above the previous iteration and is the first five-year MOU with 
 the kingdom. The previous two MOU agreements had been in effect for three years.121 
 
 U.S. aid in Jordan primarily seeks to promote economic growth, water-scarcity solutions, 
tourism, health, democracy and governance, environment, and education, as well as a substantial 
military aid commitment.122 USAID and the Department of State are the primary project donors 
and work in close partnership with the Government of Jordan as well as the private sector and 
social organizations. “Despite budget cuts in USAID programs elsewhere, annual funding levels 
in Jordan have increased”.123 A majority of this aid is given through cash transfers with the intent 
to assist the state with foreign debt payments, the Syrian refugee crisis, and the costs of fuel 
imports.124 
Conditions of Aid 
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 Jordan has strong relationships and systems of collaboration and cooperation with donors. 
The government of Jordan and its donors “collectively design evaluation framework at the 
planning phase of the project as well as several evaluation approaches”.125 Despite imperfect 
institutional capacities, systems, economic culture, in general, “Jordan is not subject to harsh or 
significant aid conditionalities” including stipulations of substantial government reform or 
corruption control measures” because it is broadly considered by the international community to 
already possessing a relatively positive policy environment for aid.126 The common assumption 
is that states who succeed in the satisfactory implementation of aid programs do not need the 
correctional direction of conditionalities in the first place. Furthermore, aid typically produces 
positive returns “until it reaches somewhere between 15% and 45% of recipient GDP”.127 
Therefore, Jordan does not require much conditionality because it receives a low amount of aid 
relative to its GDP and the impact of foreign aid on the economic growth in Jordan can 
comfortably be assumed to be positive.128  
 However, only around 35% of aid Jordan receives is contractually untied.129 In reality 
and practice, this number is likely even lower because aid can be tied unofficially and informally 
without explicit parameters recognizing it in the aid agreement. This type of de facto tying is 
especially common in long-term standing aid relationships between donors and recipients, which 
is highly descriptive of Jordan’s relationship with at least U.S. donations.130 “Substantial 
amounts of foreign aid is tied aid in one form or another” and can be highly detrimental to aid 
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effectiveness.131 Tied aid has been shown to “increase the cost of aid projects and programs 
around 15–30 percent” which translates into a decrease in the value of foreign aid by 13–23 
percent.132 
 Despite low conditionality, there is still potential for tied aid and political conditions on 
aid “to weaken democratic prospects for developing countries” like Jordan “as it could cause 
social discontent that creates divisions in the society”.133 Jordan already has a predisposition to 
political instability and resistance due to refugee inflows and resource scarcity. Any attempts by 
donors to limit government expenditures by reducing government programs, “especially in the 
light of the fact that the government of Jordan is the biggest employer in the Kingdom” could 
destabilize the country irreversibly.134 In fact, this dynamic has already been witnessed. In the 
summer of 2018, the Jordanian Government tried to take away government subsidies on bread in 
order to reduce government expenditure, an action backed by the IMF. This resulted in mass 
protests that saw the Prime Minister Hani Mulki resign.  
Reliance on Aid 
 Trade shocks, which Jordan is greatly vulnerable to, can have significant negative 
impacts on economic growth. For this reason, aid supplied to Jordan is essential in providing a 
“cushion for negative growth effects of harmful export price shocks”. To begin with, consistent 
levels of aid, even in moderate amounts, can act as a buffer by “decreasing the proportionate 
change in foreign currency inflows”. Additionally, “counter-cyclical changes in aid can diminish 
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the change in these currency inflows” which help maintain economic stability in times of 
external shocks.135 
The National Agenda 
 Since 2005 Jordan has been implementing an “ambitious political, social and economic 
reform program” with the intent of “transforming Jordan into a modern, knowledge-based 
economy with increased productivity and employment”.136 This long-term development strategy, 
known as the National Agenda, seeks to boldly “reform and modernization of the country’s 
economic, institutional, and political infrastructure”, at least rhetorically. While significant 
improvements have been made under this reform strategy, these developmental activities have 
also caused a rise in price levels and thus increased public expenditures.137  
 In pursuit of large-scale reform, the government of Jordan has neglected economic 
integration and placed a low priority on creating stable revenue sources, leading to 
underdeveloped economic institutions.138 The “absence of systematic, long-term policy of 
resource mobilization and inadequate fiscal institutions” is potentially a side-effect of aid 
reliance in which aid is substituted for tax revenue.139 In fact, aid provided to Jordan is regularly 
substituted for domestic revenue and investment, accounting for 4-10% of gross national 
income.140 Despite increased public expenditure and lack of attention on alternative revenue 
sources “it is safe to conclude that aid does not lead to extravagance by the recipient 
government”. However, “without continued aid, the Jordanian fiscal system cannot be sustained 
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for any length of time”.141 Since 2010, foreign aid has been an “essential resource of funding 
development projects and programs in Jordan”.142  
VI. Conclusion - What Actually Effects Aid Reliance? 
 A variety of variables influence the effectiveness of aid, and therefore the continued need 
for it. Successful aid is commonly associated with ownership by the government and 
participation by the affected people, strong administrative and institutional capacity, sound 
policies and good public sector management, and close coordination by donors.143 Recipient 
governance, policies, commitment to project objectives, donor involvement, type of development 
projects, design and implementation, the relationship between the donor and the recipient, 
government employees, and aid conditionality all have profound weight in the successful 
implementation of aid.144  
 Aid effectiveness is contingent on donor-to-donor and donor-to-recipient coordination as 
well as political, social, and cultural aspects of the recipient state.145 The role of donors in 
“ensuring the effectiveness of the aid goes beyond selecting recipients” and imposing 
conditions.146 “Donor use of a partner country’s established institutions and systems increases aid 
effectiveness by strengthening the partner’s long-term capacity to develop, implement and 
account for its policies”.147 Additionally, “aid is most effective when it supports a country owned 
approach to development” and less effective policies are dictated by donors, thus giving recipient 
states low ownership and directing capacity of aid.148   
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 In the case of Jordan, donors give aid for a variety of reasons, including to address 
humanitarian needs, support economic growth, and to further strategic interests in the region.149 
In general, there is coordination and coherence between the donors and the government of Jordan 
in relation to objectives of aid.150 The moderate use of conditionality and aid tying have helped 
to promote reasonably successful short and long term public investments, development in human 
capital, and broad political and economic reform. However, after 6 decades of receiving 
moderate developmental aid, Jordan has not been able to achieve self-sustaining growth, 
significant poverty reduction, resource sustainability, or categorically good governance 
(democratization, etc.).151 
 To some, this represents a general argument against foreign aid. Instead of providing for 
development, aid “distorts markets, crowds out private investment, funds inefficient projects, is 
co-opted by corrupt officials and leads to a culture of dependency.152 To others “the basic fallacy 
inherent in official development assistance is that it can reach the powerless by going through the 
powerful”.153 Much like development theories view on aid, “rather than being left out of the 
development process” underdeveloped countries are both a resource and victim of quasi-
imperialist aid policies, which function through conditionality.154 
 Aid provision will remain a discursive topic, and the merits of conditionality are highly 
debatable. In the case of Jordan, it would seem that the moderate, middle line of conditionality 
allows for slow but attainable development, given the uneasy successes of the National Agenda. 
However, other complicating factors which are not associated with conditional aid, such as 
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regional instability and resource scarcity, still pose significant challenges to self-sustaining 
growth and therefore help create aid reliance. The episode of protest and government turnover in 
2018 suggest that strictly applied conditionality could have detrimental political effects on the 
country, resulting in an increased need for foreign assistance. If donor governments are indeed 
invested in the genuine development of middle and low-income states such as Jordan, 
conditionality need not be entirely avoided, but it should be limited to only conditions which are 
mutually agreed to be directly related to unique country requirements for growth, and donors 
should be prepared to apply conditions flexibly as to avoid destabilizing domestic political 
environments of recipient countries. This case study suggests moderate conditionality does not 
produce aid reliance, but that highly restrictive conditionality as the potential to produce 
ineffective aid environments that will lead to dependence. Future studies may seek to explore if 
the alternative situation of completely condition-less aid leads to the creation of development-
friendly environments or produces aid reliance, as well as to evaluate this paper’s hypothesis 
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